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Abstract—Glossy networks make use of concurrent transmis-
sions to achieve rapid network flooding in wireless networks with
high reliability. They are robust against jamming and header
injection attacks. We find that Glossy floods can be hijacked by
a packet injection attacker to penetrate into the network and
cause severe loss. We demonstrate the design of such an attacker
by evaluating its effectiveness in a 30-node testbed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lending to constructive interference and capture effect [1] in
radio transmissions, the Glossy flooding service has proven to
be a rapid and reliable way to disseminate information among
tens of low power sensor nodes [2]. Compared with multihop
routing, flooding provides an illusion of a flattened topology
by concealing the network’s internal structure, thus greatly
simplifying usage.
Is a Glossy network truly flat and hardened, so that it is
robust against penetration?
We have recently shown that Glossy remains intact despite
attempts from jamming and PHY-layer header injection at-
tacks [3]. It suffers noticeable losses only when the attacker
turns into an insider, i.e., runs on the Glossy protocol itself,
so that bogus packets can be injected at particular time points
relative to the communication slots arranged by Glossy’s
precisely synchronized global schedule. In order to find an
effective attack with minimal protocol dependence, we first
analyze the unbuffered radio reception process used by Glossy,
which plays an important role to filter out intrusive packets.
We then identify the wake-up periods preceding each Glossy
flooding to offer a precious time window for an intruder to
inject packets into the network. The bogus frames are sent
in the CC2420 radio’s cyclic transmission mode, previously
exploited by us to successfully disrupt low-duty cycle, random
access MAC protocols [4].
Our penetration tests lead to a surprising discovery. Glossy’s
anonymous flooding service, underpinned by concurrent radio
transmissions, turns out to be a double-edge sword. On one
hand, the concurrent transmissions provide abundant link
redundancy, often sufficient to swarm out foreign packets from
a single malicious attacker. On the other hand, an attacker
capable of disguising bogus frames as legitimate ones is given
access to the whole network by free-riding on Glossy floods.
The resultant damage of such hijacked floods turns out to
be much wider in range than a full duty-cycle jammer. We
call our attack Arpeggio, since a bogus frame ripples across
the network hop-by-hop, in a similar fashion to that of a
harpist playing an ascending sequence of notes by sweeping
her fingers across the harp strings. Our evaluation shows that,
using a minimal level of TX power, an attacker located at
the fringe of a 30-node Glossy network can cause over 50%
packet loss to all nodes except a few that are in the immediate
transmission range of the Glossy initiator. Three attackers can
together bring down the aggregate PRR to 30%. This raises a
security alarm, because the attack poses an immediate threat
to all Glossy-based systems. We also show that the attacker’s
relative hop distance to a legitimate flood initiator is a decisive
factor on whether the attack makes a shallow dent or a deep
breach. By exposing the internal structure of a Glossy network
previously treated as flat, Arpeggio provides useful guidance
for developers to harden specific instances of such a network.
Our main contributions are:
∙ Identification of the precise mechanism that bolster
Glossy’s robustness against existing header injection at-
tacks.
∙ Design of a packet injection attack for an unsynchronized,
low power radio transmitter, that exploits Glossy floods
to penetrate the network.
∙ Evaluation of the efficacy of the attack under various
configurations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
provides a background on Glossy and the Low Power Wireless
bus that provides an link layer abstraction to Glossy; we then
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of Glossy in Sec. III,
based on which we design and implement our attack described
in Sec. IV and Sec. V; we evaluate the attack in Sec. VI; after
a summary of related work (VII), we conclude by Sec. VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
We first describe how the Low-Power Wireless Bus uses
Glossy flooding to provide a TDMA MAC service to the upper
layers. We then describe the Drizzle PHY header injection
attack, whose radio transmission mechanism forms the basis
of our packet injection attack.
A. Low-Power Wireless Bus on Glossy
Glossy’s high efficiency and reliability has been testified by
its usage as the main MAC layer communication primitive by
several novel data dissemination protocols [5]–[8]. Glossy has
also been used to transport general traffic patterns, with the
help of a link layer abstraction called the low power wireless
bus (LWB), which provides a convenient API for unicast
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Fig. 1. Composition of slots in a LWB round. Each round begins with a slot
for the schedule. There can be several data slots and few contention slots.
and broadcast together with a TDMA scheme to coordinate
channel access [9].
LWB uses scheduled slots to control network-wide Glossy
floods. Glossy floods use the fact that simultaneous transmis-
sions of the same packet interfere constructively at a receiver
to achieve very fast and reliable network floods. Nodes in
Glossy retransmit every data packet several times to further
increase robustness.
In LWB, time is split into communication rounds, which in
turn are divided in slots. Every slot consists of a number of
repeated floods. The schedule of slots for each communication
round is prepared by a dedicated controller node called host.
Figure 1 depicts the composition of slots in an LWB round.
Each round begins with a slot for the schedule that specifies
the round period, the time at the host, data slots and contention
slots.
Nodes use data slots for sending/receiving application data.
The assignment of a data slot to a node indicates that the
node becomes the initiator of a Glossy flood while other nodes
become receivers of the Glossy flood. In this way, all other
nodes receive what the initiator node has sent and then can
filter the data locally based on interest.
A schedule may contain contention slots during which any
node can send its demand for slots to the host. In contention
slots, packet collisions are possible. However, one packet
typically reaches the host due to the capture effect [1].
At the end of each round, the host computes a new schedule
for the next round based on the demand of the nodes. The slot
allocation for a schedule is dictated by the scheduling policy
at the host and can be based on factors such as throughput,
latency and energy efficiency.
B. Drizzle header injection attack
Symbol synchronization is required for a radio receiver to
correctly decode a frame. This is achieved by the receiver
locking onto a SYN header detected at the beginning of a
transmitted frame. Once synchronized to the symbol boundary
implied by the header, the receiver proceeds to decode the
subsequent frame length header, and continues to decode and
store an N-byte payload into a hardware frame buffer. An
802.15.4 receiver usually automates this process for optimal
performance, exposing itself for a DoS attack that we show in a
previous work [4]. Comprising only a three-byte bogus header
dubbed Droplet, a bogus frame can trigger the receiver’s frame
decoding/buffering process. When transmitted in the CC2420
radio’s cyclic transmission mode, the droplets become a drizzle
that repeatedly lock the receiver into futile work. The Drizzle
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Fig. 2. The Drizzle attack. A receiver wakes up to an ever-present stream of
bogus headers, thus deprived of the chance to receive legitimate data frames.
attack, depicted in Fig. 2, has been shown to hit hard against
the low-duty cycle, carrier-sensing ContikiMAC. The strength
of Drizzle lies in its compact organization of short bogus
headers (spaced at 96𝜇𝑠 intervals), making its target very
susceptible to mistakenly synchronizing to one of them upon
wake-up.
III. ANALYSIS
We analyze the reasons why Glossy appears very robust
against interference, despite its use of the low-cost 802.15.4
radio hardware.
A. Glossy’s link redundancy
Glossy’s finely time-synchronized nodes collaborate in
flooding the whole network by retransmitting the original
message from a source node several times within a tight time
window of just a few milliseconds. Since all nodes participate
in the retransmissions, the probability that a copy of the
message reach the destination is greatly enhanced, even if
some individual links are weak. Occasional interference from
coexisting radio transmitters causes negligible harm, because
most of these transmissions occur outside of the narrow time
windows when nodes wake up to communicate with each
other according to a global schedule. When interference falls
inside a wake-up window, Glossy flooding is more resilient
than conventional ARQ-based unicasts, thanks to the greater
link redundancy provided by all the nodes synchronously
retransmitting the same packet multiple times. Moreover,
Glossy’s highly customized radio driver mitigates the averse
effect caused by foreign packets, as we show next.
B. Radio receptions: fully buffered, partially buffered, and
unbuffered
The usual procedure for packet reception in low power
radios involves usage of a hardware frame buffer in the radio.
The radio decodes and buffers a whole packet in its RX FIFO;
it generates an interrupt to wake up the MCU; the latter then
reads the buffered packet via the SPI bus into its RAM for
frame decoding and other upper layer protocol processing.
Because this procedure is entirely sequential, it is safe and
simple to implement; benefiting from deep sleeping modes of
modern MCU’s, it also minimizes power consumption.
An alternative approach that reduces latency and increases
throughput allows an incoming packet to be only partially
buffered. By programming the radio to wake up the MCU
as soon as a portion of the packet is decoded, a two-stage
pipeline is created to parallelize radio reception and MCU bus
read. Due to data rate difference between the air interface and
the SPI bus (the latter being higher), however, the pipeline
would stall if the radio’s RX FIFO underflows. Optimizing
the pipeline throughput based on an estimated packet length
and handling occasional underflows add considerable software
complexity as well as a degree of performance variation to the
device driver. The MCU’s duty cycle also increases when the
pipeline stalls, leading to energy waste.
To achieve extremely low latency, Glossy’s rapid network-
wide flooding design requires a minimal transition time be-
tween a packet’s reception and retransmission. Moreover, the
protocol’s reliance on concurrent radio transmissions imposes
a very small tolerance in software processing latency, equiva-
lent to just a fourth of a symbol period (0.5𝜇𝑠), during packet
reception. Therefore, the Glossy radio driver adopts an even
more aggressive approach than the partial buffer method in
reading the radio’s RX FIFO buffer. The radio is programmed
to raise an interrupt as soon as the 802.15.4 PHY-layer header
is received, so that the MCU starts to poll a hardware pin to
read subsequent bytes one after one as soon as they arrive.
This results in a sequence of single-byte SPI read accesses.
Consequently, a higher overhead than a normal multiple-byte
access is incurred, mainly by the repeated transmissions of the
same SPI address to retrieve each data byte. Because the MCU
is occupied throughout the whole reception process, which can
last over 4𝑚𝑠 for large packets, extra energy is consumed and
other pending tasks are locked out temporarily.
Fig. 3 illustrates the three modes of radio reception.
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Fig. 3. Three modes of radio reception: fully buffered, partially buffered, and
unbuffered. Glossy’s unbuffered reading minimizes software delay, at the cost
of extra CPU overhead.
Unbuffered reception is rewarded by minimal packet re-
transmission latency. Immediately after the last byte is re-
ceived, a relay counter field is updated, then the whole packet
is retransmitted.1
C. Glossy’s robustness against coexisting transmitters
Glossy’s unbuffered radio reception includes header check-
ing that can result in premature termination of the process.
The first two received bytes, namely the payload length byte
1Glossy makes a further optimization to reduce software delay, letting a
packet’s last 8 bytes to automatically queue into the RX FIFO and raise an
interrupt on completion.
and Glossy application header byte, are decoded in situ so
that the radio can terminate an ongoing frame reception.
Foreign packets with a mismatching size or missing a proper
app header are thus canceled early during decoding. Without
header checking, any received packets would be retransmitted,
which would interfere destructively with the ongoing flooding.
The result is a certain degree of robustness against random
interference.
We previously noted that injection of 802.15.4 PHY head-
ers by the Drizzle attack has negligible averse effects on
Glossy [3]. In light of the new analysis, we suspect the
main reason is the header checking mechanism that terminates
radio reception of foreign packets. To verify our conjec-
ture, we launch the Drizzle attack at the fringe of a 30-
node Glossy network, and collect statistics of both packet
losses and header/checksum errors.2 The network consists
of a source node, a host (scheduler) node, and 28 receiver
nodes; they transmit at the maximum 10𝑑𝐵𝑚 power level;
The attacker transmits at −25𝑑𝐵𝑚. 100 packets are sent in
each test run. With the maximum retransmission counter set to
three, a Glossy flood creates a total number of approximately
100× 30× 3 = 9000 transmissions. Over 8 runs, the attacker
ramps up its attack duration, from 0 % to 100 % of the run
period. Fig. 4 shows our Drizzle attack is futile, causing very
few packet losses. However, one of the receiver nodes located
close to the attacker records a large amount of header errors
(Fig. 4(b)). But thanks to Glossy’s early termination of foreign
packets, that receiver has received all legitimate packets. On
the other hand, the barrage of bogus headers is completely
unnoticed by the other nodes due to limitation of the attacker’s
transmission power (Fig. 4(c)).
D. Glossy fends off bogus application header injection attacks
How about injection of legitimate Glossy application head-
ers? They should be able to bypass the simple header checking.
Would a large amount of such payload-free headers destabilize
the tight retransmission rounds of Glossy floods? We modify
the Drizzle attack, extending the encapsulated “droplets” by
an extra byte consisting of a legitimate Glossy application
header. As the close-to-perfect PRR’s in Fig. 5(a) indicates,
this attack hardly dents the peripheral of the network, let alone
penetrate it. We can observe however a remarkable shift of
Node 202’s error pattern, now characteristic of a proportional
increase in CRC errors as the attack duration prolongs (5(b)).
This shows that a significant number of bogus headers manage
to pass the header checking. However, the data redundancy
provided by the numerous Glossy retransmissions is sufficient
to compensate the bandwidth loss by this single receiver with
high CRC errors.
This unsuccessful attack becomes the stepping stone for our
next attempt, which proves to be highly effective.
2Detailed testbed set-up is available later in the Evaluation section
(a) Aggregate PRR among all 28 receivers
(b) Node 202: error statistics (c) The other 27 nodes
Fig. 4. Futile Drizzle attack against 30-node Glossy network. Attack duration
increases from 0% to 100% over 8 runs, in 16% steps. Node 202 is exposed
to an extraordinary amount of LEN header and Glossy header errors as the
close-by attacker ramps up its attack duration, but still retains a 100% PRR,
thanks to early termination of such errors and abundant retransmissions from
other nodes.
(a) Aggregate PRR among all 28 receivers
(b) Node 202: error statistics (c) The other 27 nodes
Fig. 5. Unsuccessful Glossy application header attack against a 30-node
Glossy network. Attack duration increases from 0% to 100% over 8 runs,
in 16% steps. Node 202 experiences an increasing number of CRC errors as
the attacker prolongs its transmission, but still achieves a 99.6% PRR, thanks
to abundant retransmissions from other nodes. The latter do not observe any
anomalies, as they are located outside of the attacker’s range.
IV. ATTACKER DESIGN
The insight obtained from the previous analysis points us
towards further extension of the header inject attack in order to
pass the CRC check. By forging bogus packets and injecting
them at the fringe of a Glossy network, we hope to see them
propagate across the whole network by surfing on the waves
of Glossy floods.
A. Attack model: a time window to jump onto a flood
The timeline of a Glossy flood depicted in Fig. 6 exposes a
time window for our attacker to launch. Despite all nodes in
a Glossy network wake up at the same time to participate in
concurrent transmissions, they join the flood at different time
slots, based on their hop distance from the initiator node. The
idle wake-up time for immediate neighbors of the initiator is
very small, consisting of a short guard time (500 𝜇𝑠) and a
few tens of CPU cycles of software delay. However, receivers
located at hop two need to wait until the initial packet is
relayed by hop-one neighbors. This leaves open a full relay
slot, of a few 𝑚𝑠, for the attacker to inject a frame to hop two
receivers after they wake up. Nodes located further down the
flooding path have even longer idle listening time, proportional
to their hop distance to the initiator. During the time these
nodes wait for a flood from upstream, they are vulnerable to
other packet sources.
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Fig. 6. The Glossy flooding process wakes up all receivers at the same time,
leaving receivers more than one hop away from the initiator a considerable
idle listening time window. Its length is equivalent to one or multiple full
packet time slots.
B. Bogus data packet
An LWB data packet consists of an 8-byte header: an 8-bit
Glossy application header is followed by two 16-bit addresses,
a 8-bit payload length, an 8-bit counter for packets in the
queue, and finally an 8-bit data option. Without studying the
source code in detail, we simply use a radio sniffer to collect
a set of packet samples and craft a data packet that consists of
a legitimate 8-bit header but no payload. We append a 16-bit
CRC checksum to the frame, so that it can pass the CRC check
on radio receivers. For easy distinction between our packet and
packets sent by other nodes, we use a source address different
from that of the authentic source node of our test application.
The application accepts both at the receiver nodes, but only
counts packets originated from the authentic source node as
correct receptions in its statistics counter. The total length
of the bogus frame, including an 802.15.4 header, becomes
13 bytes. It is therefore considerably longer than the 3-byte
“Droplet” used in Drizzle, but still quite short compared with
a normal data packet, which can be over 130 bytes including
the preamble. Transmission of this bogus frame in tight packs,
using the cyclic TX mode of the CC2420 radio, is illustrated
in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7. Injection of a bogus data frame to generate a Glossy flood. The frame
is relayed over multiple hops to reach a range far outside of the attacker’s
radio transmission range.
Later we will show that this continuous stream of frames has
a rather high likelihood to be detected by an awakened Glossy
node and to be mistakenly retransmitted to other nodes. We do
not assume the attacker has superior TX power: it is very likely
to be overwhelmed by a concurrent Glossy transmitter. But if
accepted by one or more Glossy receivers, the bogus frame is
then retransmitted at the same TX power as legitimate frames,
with greatly enhanced probability of being flooded across the
whole network.
C. Bogus LWB schedule
One other important packet type underpins a Glossy-based
LWB network: the schedule packets broadcast periodically
from the host node. They carry global time information used
by all nodes to schedule their data transmissions: host address,
current time at host, number of data slots in current round,
round period, number of contention slots. Nodes buffer the
application data packets locally until they have data slots
allocated in the schedule. As the buffer is limited in size,
new application data packets are discarded when the buffer
is full. It is simple for us to forge bogus schedule frames
by modifying the content of a sniffed packet. In an attempt
to make the network unstable, we send strings of 9-byte long
synch packets that indicate zero available slots, in the Arpeggio
manner. The frame format is shown in Fig 8.
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Fig. 8. Injection of a bogus LWB schedule frame. This would reset the
network-wide schedule complied by all nodes.
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Fig. 9. The timing configuration used for schedule, data and contention slots
and schedule computation.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we present some details on the implementa-
tion that we use for the evaluation in the next section.
A. LWB application
To evaluate the effectiveness of the attacks, we implement a
test application. The application runs on an LWB network that
contains an LWB host, a source node, and multiple receiver
nodes. The host node defines the schedule so that all possible
data slots are allocated to the source node, i.e., the source
node uses all data slots to send data packets in each round.
Glossy implicitly enables all receiver nodes in the network
to receive these packets. Each application packet carries a
sequence number to identify the packets that are lost during
an attack. We use serial data output and general purpose
input/output pins of the Tmote Sky nodes for debugging and
obtaining packet loss information to assess the spread of the
attack. A typical test run consists of 100 data frames, each 28-
bytes in size, sent from the source node at 125 ms intervals. We
collect packet reception ratio and three error statistics (CRC,
LEN header, and Glossy app header) after each run. The RSSI
and LQI of each received frame are also recorded.
B. LWB timing
We use the Tmote Sky implementation of Glossy and LWB
for Contiki OS in our experiments. We configure Glossy to
retransmit each packet maximally three times during schedule,
data and contention slots. In order to adhere to the timing
constraints, we configure Glossy and LWB with the timing
parameters shown in Figure 9. We set the duration of each
LWB data slot to 30 ms which is sufficient for three re-
transmissions of a 127 byte large packet. Glossy disables
hardware interrupts that may interfere with Glossy’s tight
timing constraints.Therefore, we use a 4 ms gap between two
slots in order to allow the execution of hardware interrupts
used by Contiki’s internals. Note that nodes turn off their
radios during this time gap. Therefore, attacker’s bogus packets
during this time gap do not affect the packet reception in the
subsequent slot.
C. Attacker
We implement the attacker on Z1 and Tmote Sky sensors.
Both carry an MSP430 MCU and a CC2420 radio. We develop
the software as an application running on the Contiki OS for
these platforms and modify the CC2420 radio driver to support
the cyclic transmission mode needed for Arpeggio. When the
radio transmits in this mode continuously, it is quite hard to
track its actual status, as all its IO pins are stuck at the same
level. We therefore rely on a separate sniffer node to capture
the attacker’s transmissions.
To be able to alter the attacker’s multitude of parameters,
such as the content of the attack frame at runtime, we develop a
sophisticated set of serial debugging commands. For example,
our program stores a static array of commonly used frames,
ranging from the original “Droplet” header to LWB’s schedule
packet. These frames can be selected at runtime. Furthermore,
we allow the user to key in frame snippets from the serial port,
and then assemble a new frame by combining the snippets with
a frame in the static array. Our usual software development
workflow involves setting up a small 5-node Glossy network
in our office and then launching a sole attacker and a sniffer to
observe the effects, altering certain parameters along the way.
When satisfied, we upload the code to the 31-node Flocklab
testbed to run a full test, then collect the log files to perform
some analysis.
Because the attacker program is unsynchronized with the
test application, we need some means to automatically launch
attack runs at approximately the same time when the applica-
tion’s source node starts data floods, so that repeatable results
can be attained. We therefore initialize the attacker to be in
a listening mode, only to switch to transmission mode when
it detects one of the first five sequence numbers in a 100-
packet test run. In order to derive the relationship between
attack duration and packet loss, the attacker ramps up its attack
duration in a number of linear steps after each run, from 0%
to 100% of the total run time.
VI. EVALUATION
We conduct experiments in the FlockLab testbed [10] using
31 Tmote Sky sensor nodes. Figure 10 shows the topology of
FlockLab. All experiments are conducted on channel 26, the
one with lowest noise level.
A. Testbed Setup
We select node 201 to be our primary attacker, as it is
located away from the main building and has the longest
average distance to all other nodes. When transmitting at -25
dBm power, this attacker can only reach its closest neighbor,
Node 202, located about 15𝑚 away. Node 33 hosts our global
LWB scheduler; We use Node 4 as an LWB broadcast source
to initiate all Glossy data floods. Both have rich connectivity
with multiple neighbor nodes, and are safely outside of the
attacker’s transmission range. All Glossy nodes transmit at
10 dBm, the maximum level allowed for CC2420. We want
to stress that the main objective of our test configurations
is revealing insights of the operation of a compromised
Glossy network from a few perspectives, rather than inflicting
maximum packet loss or causing complete service disruption.
Therefore, the attacker only launches radio transmissions
after the network enters a stable state, when all nodes are
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Fig. 10. The topology of the Sky nodes in FlockLab.
synchronized to the global schedule. A malicious attacker may,
however, use the same method, albeit with a more powerful
radio transmitter and more precise timing, in an attempt to
force the network into perpetual bootstrapping.
B. Bogus Data Packet Attack
Over 8 successive test runs spaced at 30𝑠 intervals, the at-
tacker transmits a sequence of bogus data packets in Arpeggio
mode, stepping up the sequence length by two seconds per run.
The attacker remains idle in the first run, so that we can use the
resultant 100% PRR as our baseline for the subsequent runs
with high confidence. In the last run, the attacker is switched
on shortly after the first detected data packet and remains
active until the last one is sent. The overall PRR aggregated
from the 28 receiver nodes over the test runs are shown in
Fig. 11. We can see that the average PRR drops successively
from 100% to 56.9%. This is very impressive compared with
our previous two futile attempts with Drizzle and Glossy app
headers.
Investigation into the large variations among nodes leads us
an interesting discovery, which we explain using the individual
PRR’s of three nodes in Fig. 12: Node 202, the attacker’s close
neighbor; Node 2, a close neighbor of the source node; and
Node 7, a node at far east corner many hops away from both
the attacker and source. Despite located over 50 away from
each other, Node 202 and Node 7 display very similar loss
patterns over the runs, whereas Node 2 is unaffected by the
increasing intensity of the attack.
Fig. 11. Aggregate packet reception ratio (PRR) over 8 successively runs
with increasingly longer attacks launched from Node 201. PRR values are
averaged among all 28 receiver nodes. The two error bars per column indicate
the standard deviation and maximum/minimum values across the nodes. The
aggregate PRR decreases monotonically as the attack intensifies.
Zooming further into the last run in Fig. 13, we observe
a striking semblance between Node 202 and Node 7 in
the actual sequence numbers missing among their received
packets, despite they probably receive those packets from two
completely disjoint sets of Glossy neighbor nodes, implied
from the lack of correlation between their RSSI and LQI
values. This is a strong evidence that our bogus data packets
successfully ride on some of the Glossy floods, hijacking the
concurrent transmissions for propagate themselves across the
network. A scan in the serial output log file confirms that
the original bogus data packets, embedding a distinct source
address, do reach the majority of receiver nodes.
Fig. 12. Individual PRR over 8 successively runs by three receiver nodes
located at very different locations relative to the attacker and source node.
Nevertheless, our evaluation also reveals a few receiver
nodes, all located close to the source node, appear intact from
infiltration. Theses close neighbors of the source node form a
strong stronghold around it.
C. Multiple Attackers
We upgrade our bogus data attack by converting two more
nodes, Node 3 and Node 17, into Arpeggio transmission. A
repetition of the eight test runs show an elevated degree of
damage. The average PRR drops below 30% in the last run,
and some nodes suffer over 90% loss. However, the stronghold
of five nodes around the source remains relatively intact. We
(a) Node 202
(b) Node 7
Fig. 13. Packet losses in a single run of bogus data attack by Node 202 and
Node 7. The two nodes miss many common packet seqno’s, an indication
that they are overwhelmed by the same Glossy floods contaminated by the
attacker.
show the aggregate PRR’s of these well-defended nodes, in
comparison with the aggregate PRR’s of the other severely
compromised nodes in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15.
Fig. 14. We identify a set of five nodes located closely around the source
node that repel the attackers.
Fig. 15. Reception at 21 receiver nodes are heavily compromised under the
simultaneous attack of three Arpeggio nodes.
The distinct partition of the receiver nodes into these two
groups proves the correctness of our attack model: one-hop
neighbors of the initiator have a short wake-up window that
is hard to capture by an outsider node, but other downstream
nodes in the flood have a large likelihood to wake up to a
bogus frame encapsulated in an infinite Arpeggio stream.
The scenario becomes entirely different if we attempt to
attack the stronghold directly. We repeat the single node,
bogus data attack by launching it from Node 1 instead. We
observe only a very minor drop in PRR (< 2%) across all
nodes over the whole eight test runs. Our penetration attack
thus unravels the dynamic internal structure of Glossy floods,
implying that the strength of its defense might shift around
in unpredicted fashions, as nodes rotate their roles between
initiator and receiver.
D. Bogus LWB Schedule Attack
We launch the second variant of Arpeggio, embedding fake
schedule information in bogus LWB packets. Fig. 16 shows
that we again achieve a high degree of infiltration to the
network, reducing the average PRR to 48.4% in the last run.
The amount of header errors and CRC errors detected by the
nodes are not significantly higher than those in normal Glossy
floods, as shown in Figure 17.
Fig. 16. Aggregate packet reception ratio (PRR) over 8 successive runs with
increasingly longer attacks launched from Node 3.
Fig. 17. Error statistics collected from the LWB schedule injection attack
VII. RELATED WORK
We have shown that Glossy is very robust against several
attacks on its availability [3]. Besides being robust against
attempts to break Glossy’s constructive interference by not
obeying Glossy’s timing constraints, they have also shown
that Glossy is robust against jamming and the Drizzle attack.
Motivated by their results, we investigate deeper why Glossy
is robust against the Drizzle attack and modify it to be more
effective.
There are also other attacks against low-power wireless
networks. Wood et al. present several denial-of-service attacks
on wireless sensor networks and ways to map the jammed
region [11]. Along the same lines, Xu et al. present several
attacks on wireless networks and complementary mechanisms
to detect them [12].
Yang et al. have presented LearJam, an energy-efficient
attack against duty-cycled networks [13]. In LearJam, the at-
tackers learn the transmission period and then jam the wireless
channel when nodes are transmitting. This way, the attackers
save energy. Similar attacks on LWB would be possible if
the host reuses the same schedule over many rounds. The
authors also present ways of mitigating the jamming attack by
rescheduling transmission patterns. Tiloca et al. have presented
JAMMY [14] that varies the schedule in TDMA-based sensor
networks. Their approach is decentralized in that each node
computes the slot allocation of the next superframe in a
distributed and autonomous fashion.
Other energy-efficient attacks have been presented by Li
et al. [15] who discuss optimal attack and network defense
strategies for single-channel wireless sensor networks. Law et
al. demonstrate attacks against several MAC layers showing
that it takes little effort to implement effective jammers even
without detailed knowledge of the MAC protocols [16]. Wil-
helm et al. present reactive jamming that monitors the wireless
channel and jams only when the channel is busy [17]. EDJam
tries to avoid energy consumption for channel monitoring by
getting knowledge about transmission periods in advance [18].
While these attacks are energy-efficient, they would likely have
the same effect as other jamming attacks on Glossy in that
the effect would be constrained to the local area around the
jammer as shown in our jamming attacks against Glossy [3].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We successfully demonstrate a packet injection attack that
can penetrate deeply into Glossy networks, by free-riding on
the concurrent transmission mechanism of Glossy floods. We
achieve a reduction in packet reception ratio much greater
than previous attempts using jamming or header injection
attacks. Our results reveal that Glossy networks’ perceived
robustness against malicious attacks need re-examination, and
we encourage network developers to bolster their defenses.
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